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We use state-level panel data for federal fiscal years 1980–1998 to estimate the impacts of 
welfare reform and the business cycle on food stamp caseloads. The model we employ is a dynamic 
function of past caseloads, economic factors, AFDC and Food Stamp Program policies, political factors, 
AFDC caseload levels, and unobserved fixed and trending heterogeneity. Our results suggest that the 
robust economy has substantially influenced the recent decline in food stamp caseloads, but that the 
estimated aggregate effect of welfare reform is modest—we attribute around 45 percent of 1994–1998 
decline to the macroeconomy and about 5 percent to welfare reform. We do find substantial heterogeneity 
in the impact of AFDC waiver policies. States with JOBS sanctions policies but not family cap or 
earnings disregard waivers can expect a larger long-run decline in caseloads than those states with all 
three policies. In addition, we do find some evidence, albeit weaker, that states with waivers for 
unemployed able-bodied adults without dependents can expect higher caseload levels than states without 
the waivers and that the Electronic Benefits Transfer program is leading to food stamp caseload declines. 
An important finding of this study is that modeling food stamp caseload dynamics has implications for 
the estimated effects of policy changes and economic factors—when dynamic models are employed, we 
observe substantially reduced welfare-reform effects but significantly increased effects of the 
macroeconomy on food stamp caseloads. These results are robust to models that permit the simultaneous 
determination of AFDC and food stamp caseloads.  
Welfare Reform and Food Stamp Caseload Dynamics 
 
 
  The number of food stamp recipients fell from a historic high of 27.5 million in 1994 to 17.4 
million by the end of 1999. During this period of unprecedented decline, the cash welfare system was 
transformed first with state-level waivers from federal requirements on the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and then by passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The waivers, along with PRWORA, introduced 
new rules on cash-assistance recipients such as terminal time limits, work requirements, and personal 
responsibility measures, which also likely affected the food stamp caseload since almost all AFDC 
recipients receive food stamps.
1 PRWORA also had a direct administrative effect on the Food Stamp 
Program by ending the eligibility of some recipients, reducing average benefit levels, and requiring states 
to replace paper coupons with Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards by October 2002. Concurrent 
with these reforms is the longest post-World War II economic expansion, a boom that has resulted in the 
lowest unemployment rates in 30 years and the highest employment rates for single female-headed 
households to date. The concurrent nature of the robust economy and the major changes in welfare policy 
make it impossible to casually ascribe credit for the recent caseload changes to policies or economic 
growth, but both seem highly likely to have contributed to the recent caseload reductions. In this paper we 
propose a model of food stamp caseload dynamics that quantifies the relative impacts of welfare reform 
and the business cycle on food stamp caseloads. 
  Several recent papers have documented the relative contributions of the business cycle and 
welfare reform to AFDC caseload declines (Bartik and Eberts 1999; Blank 1997; Council of Economic 
Advisers [CEA] 1997, 1999; Figlio and Ziliak 1999; Moffitt 1999; Wallace and Blank 1999; Ziliak et al. 
2000). Most of these papers focus on the pre-PRWORA period when the Department of Health and 
                                                       
1PRWORA also replaced the AFDC program with a new state block-grant program called Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). For convenience we will refer to the program as AFDC throughout the 
paper. 2 
Human Services selectively granted states’ requests for waivers from federal AFDC requirements. While 
as much as one-third of the 1993–1996 decline in AFDC caseloads has been attributed to welfare reform 
(CEA 1997), Figlio and Ziliak (1999) and Ziliak et al. (2000) argue that this estimated relationship is, in 
large measure, spurious for the pre-PRWORA era. They argue that once caseload and business cycle 
dynamics are contolled for, little of the early caseload decline can be pegged to welfare waivers. The 
CEA (1999) updated its earlier work to include the 1997 and 1998 federal fiscal years and, when 
compared to its earlier work, found an even stronger welfare-reform effect. Although one would expect a 
larger role played by welfare reform because many of the initiatives required time to implement, the CEA 
continued to model the caseload process as static, not dynamic, and thus overstated the role of welfare 
reform. Figlio and Ziliak (1999), for instance, update their dynamic model to look at the post-PRWORA 
period and continue to find only a modest role for welfare reform in the aggregate national caseload 
reduction (although they find that welfare reform mattered greatly in some states). Hence, though welfare 
reform has contributed to the recent AFDC caseload decline, the consensus from this literature, as 
summarized in the recent book edited by Danziger (1999), indicates that the robust economy played the 
dominant role. 
  Perhaps surprisingly, little research has been conducted on the impact of the macroeconomy and 
welfare reform on food stamp caseloads. Wallace and Blank (1999) are a recent exception in their use of 
both static annual and dynamic monthly food stamp caseload models based on state-level panel data for 
the 1980 to 1998 federal fiscal years. They found that food stamp caseloads were strongly countercyclical 
and that the reform of AFDC led to weak declines in total caseloads. Specifically, they attribute up to 44 
percent of the food stamp caseload decline between 1994 and 1998 to economic conditions and about 6 
percent of the decline to welfare reform. 
  We improve upon the previous research on food stamp caseloads along several dimensions. First, 
we follow other research in estimating the impact of AFDC policy changes on food stamp caseloads, but 
we also examine the direct impact of food stamp policies on food stamp caseloads such as the 
introduction of EBT, waivers from the work requirement for unemployed able-bodied adults without 3 
dependents (ABAWDs), and administrative error rates. Second, we consider several methods of modeling 
the policy variables. Specifically, aside from specifying the AFDC policy reform as an aggregate “any 
waiver” variable, we also consider models in which this variable is allowed to have a nonlinear impact 
before and after passage of PRWORA, models in which the waivers are disaggregated into their 
component parts such as time limits and work requirements, and models in which we use the 
implementation dates of the waivers rather than approval dates. Third, we permit general macroeconomic 
factors in the dynamic caseload models that will capture national reforms such as the expansions in the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the mid-1990s. Finally, we directly explore the possibility of 
simultaneity between food stamp and AFDC caseloads with a structural econometric model. Our 
instrumental variables estimator identifies the model parameters by exploiting the fact that a state’s need 
standard affects AFDC caseloads directly but only affects food stamp caseloads indirectly via its effect on 
AFDC.  
Across all the models, we find that the effect of welfare reform on food stamp caseloads is very 
modest. We attribute at most 9 percent of the recent decline to welfare reform in our preferred dynamic 
models. In contrast, the macroeconomy has had a major impact on food stamp caseloads, accounting for 
about 45 percent of the 1994–1998 decline in the preferred dynamic models. We do find evidence of 
heterogeneity in the impact of AFDC waiver policies—states with JOBS sanctions policies but not family 
cap or earnings disregard waivers can expect a larger long-run decline in caseloads than those states with 
all three policies. When dynamic models are employed, we observe substantially reduced welfare-reform 
effects but significantly increased effects of the macroeconomy on food stamp caseloads.  4 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
  The data we use for the analysis span all 50 states and the District of Columbia for federal fiscal 
years 1980–1998.
2 We obtained information on administrative food stamp caseloads, EBT measures, 
ABAWD waivers, and error rates from the U.S. Department of Agriculture; data on administrative AFDC 
caseloads from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS); data on AFDC policy 
reform measures from Crouse (1999); data on combined AFDC/food stamp benefits and state need 
standards for a three-person family from selected issues of the Committee on Ways and Means Green 
Book; data on business-cycle measures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; data on state population from 
the U.S. Census Bureau; and data on state political conditions from the Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA), the National Governors Association, and the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Table A1 
contains summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. 
  We present descriptive evidence on trends in total food stamp and AFDC caseloads (Figure 1), 
and average state unemployment rates and per capita employment growth rates (Figure 2). In each 
diagram we highlight with vertical lines the years in which major federal tax and/or transfer legislation 
was passed—the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), which lowered marginal income tax rates 
but raised the AFDC benefit reduction rate; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), which lowered 
marginal income tax rates further, removed over 6 million Americans from the tax rolls and expanded the 
EITC; the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA88), which expanded Medicaid coverage and required all 
states to offer the AFDC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program to low-income, two-parent 
households; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 (OBRA90) and 1993 (OBRA93), both of 
which, among other things, expanded the EITC; and PRWORA in 1996.  
                                                       
2Currently, the amount of food stamps a household receives is inversely related to its income. Before 1980, 
all households had to purchase a fixed amount of food stamps, with the price rising with income. While 
understanding the impact of this “purchase requirement” on food stamp caseloads is interesting, this major change in 
the structure of the Food Stamp Program makes it more appropriate to use the post-1980 period. 5 
  Figure 1 depicts the dramatic swings in food stamp and AFDC caseloads in the 1990s alluded to 
in the previous section. Interestingly, aggregate caseloads do not seem to be related in an obvious fashion 
to any one piece of federal legislation. It is clear that the upward trend in caseloads occurred after passage 
of FSA88, but the more pronounced increase occurred after OBRA90, which contained little in the way of 
legislation affecting low-income households except for the EITC expansion (which, if anything, should 
lower caseloads). Aggregate welfare caseloads began declining after mid-1994, about 2 years before 
passage of PRWORA. Although this was a period of aggressive AFDC waiver approvals, Figlio and 
Ziliak (1999) and Ziliak et al. (2000) attribute little of the AFDC caseload declines to the waivers. There 
does, however, appear to be an acceleration of caseload declines after passage of PRWORA, suggesting 
that our econometric model should permit estimated policy effects to diverge before and after PRWORA.  
  Figure 2 shows how average business cycle conditions evolved over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Notable in this figure is the substantial increase in average state unemployment rates in the early 1980s, 
followed by a long secular decline after 1983. Aggregate caseloads were stubbornly constant during this 
period of declining unemployment rates, possibly because per capita employment growth rates were 
constant after 1984. The 1990–1992 surge in average unemployment rates was coincident with the early 
1990s caseload growth, but unemployment declined and employment growth increased prior to the mid-
1990s caseload declines. This pattern suggests that a dynamic relationship may exist between the business 
cycle and welfare caseloads, and our empirical model should permit such dynamic responses. 
Empirical Model 
The figures presented in the previous section are informative in that they offer guidance for the 
structure of our empirical model. They are only suggestive, however, because they are either aggregated 
to the national level or averaged across states and thus ignore potential variation in caseloads across 
states. Based on the AFDC caseload research of Figlio and Ziliak (1999) and Ziliak et al. (2000), we 



















Figure 1: Trends in Total AFDC and Food Stamp Caseloads 
year 
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 Figure 2: Average State Unemployment and Employment Growth Rates 
year 
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business cycle conditions, welfare policies, political factors, and unobserved fixed and trending 
differences across states. 
Specifically, our model for state i (i=1,...,51) in time period t (t=1,...,19) is 
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where Cit is the natural log of per capita food stamp caseloads; Uit is the unemployment rate; Eit is the 
growth rate in employment per capita, defined as the annual difference in log per capita employment; Wit 
is either a scalar or vector of welfare reform indicators that equals the fraction of a year that a statewide 
AFDC waiver is in effect; Bit is the real maximum AFDC plus food stamp benefit for a family of three; 
EBTit is an indicator that equals the fraction of a year that a state’s recipients received benefits via the 
Electronic Benefits Transfer program; ABAWDit is the weighted percentage of a state’s population waived 
from work requirements for unemployed able-bodied adults without dependents; ERit is the error rate in 
the food stamp eligibility process; AFDCit is the natural log of per capita AFDC caseloads; Pit is a vector 
of variables reflecting the political climate of a state; γt is a vector of year effects; δi is a time-invariant, 
state-specific deviation from the overall constant µ; λit is a state-specific linear trend; and εit is a random 
error. The fixed effects capture unobserved permanent differences in food stamp caseloads across states, 
while the state-specific trends control for trending differences in states such as migration or fertility 
patterns, or general trends in a state’s political climate that are imperfectly picked up by the political 
variables described above.
3,4 9 
  Several of the variables used in the analysis warrant further description. Food stamp caseloads 
may sluggishly adjust to changing economic conditions. We capture these dynamics by permitting 
previous food stamp caseloads to have a direct impact on future caseloads, and by permitting current and 
lagged business cycle conditions to affect current caseloads. We expect lagged unemployment and 
employment growth to be important because, given the skill set of typical food stamp recipients, they are 
likely to be the last ones hired during an economic recovery and thus may not move instantaneously from 
welfare to work. Also, unemployed persons may become eligible for food stamps only with a lag during 
an economic downturn. For example, their initial asset levels may be too high and they only become 
eligible after drawing these down. Conversely, during economic expansions, newly employed persons 
may exit the program only when their food stamps must be renewed. 
  Recent research papers on AFDC caseloads typically define welfare reform as occurring on the 
date of waiver approval from DHHS, and often this variable is aggregated into a single category, which 
we label as “AFDC waiver.” However, there is likely a lag between waiver approval and program 
implementation such that approval dates might capture other nonprogram effects occurring in states at the 
same time. Hence, in the specifications below we use both AFDC approval dates and reported 
implementation dates, and we also allow for lagged effects of the waivers. Because the AFDC welfare 
waivers are heterogeneous in scope, ranging from time-limiting benefits to sanctions for failing to comply 
with JOBS requirements to benefit caps on family size, we also explore the independent impact of these 
various waivers on food stamp caseloads. Moreover, as noted in Figure 1, it appears that caseload 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3Always a concern when estimating dynamic panel data models is the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the fixed effect, although the magnitude of this correlation, and hence the potential problem, 
diminishes as the time series becomes large (Nickell 1981). With 19 years of data, this correlation is likely to be 
small; however, in results not reported we instrumented the lagged dependent variable using lags of the economic, 
welfare, and political variables as instruments with very little change in the estimated coefficients. 
4With passage of PRWORA, most noncitizen immigrants are no longer eligible for food stamps. This 
policy change affected the entire country and thus is likely captured in the year effects. To the extent that there are 
state differences in immigration patterns that are permanent or trending linearly, these differences are captured in the 
state fixed effects and trends. The latter seems plausible given that Wallace and Blank (1999) find no significant 
impact of the percentage of a state’s population that are immigrants in static AFDC and food stamp caseload models 
after controlling for state fixed effects. 10 
declines accelerated after passage of PRWORA, suggesting a nonlinear impact of the waivers before and 
after PRWORA. We accommodate this potential nonlinearity by introducing pre- and post-PRWORA 
“AFDC waiver” variables.
5 
Almost all AFDC recipients also get food stamps, and over half of food stamp recipients receive 
AFDC benefits. As a consequence, we incorporate the AFDC program into our food stamp model in two 
waysdirectly by including the per capita AFDC caseload as a covariate, and indirectly by including the 
combined maximum AFDC/food stamp benefit for a three-person family. States did not have much 
authority over the design of their welfare programs until the 1990s, but they have had substantial voice 
with respect to the need standard and maximum benefits throughout the program history. The need 
standard is established by each state as the income level deemed necessary to meet basic consumption 
needs, and it is used to help determine who qualifies for AFDC because gross income cannot exceed 185 
percent of need. However, the actual maximum benefit is typically tied to the state’s payment standard, 
which is almost always below the need standard. Alternatively, the basic food stamp grant is fixed across 
the contiguous 48 states, with slight cost-of-living variation allowed for Alaska and Hawaii, but the food 
stamp benefit declines as the maximum AFDC benefit rises. In Figure 3 we depict trends in the combined 
maximum AFDC/food stamp benefit and in the state need standard for three-person families. While the 
food stamp benefit is tied to inflation, it is clear that states permitted the real value of their combined 
benefit package to decline throughout the period. 
A potential problem with including per capita AFDC caseloads and the combined AFDC/food 
stamp benefits as control variables is that they may not be exogenous to food stamp caseloads. There is a 
close connection between the food stamp participation decision and the AFDC participation decision  
                                                       
5We follow the CEA (1997, 1999) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999) by defining the waivers as the fraction of 
the fiscal year a waiver is in place. In situations where a state did not receive a waiver, we use the TANF plan 
approval or implementation date. In the nonlinear models, the pre-PRWORA variable equals the fraction of the year 
a waiver is in place, while the post-PRWORA variable equals the fraction of the year the TANF plan is in place. 
Unfortunately, collinearity prevents us from allowing pre- and post-PRWORA effects for the disaggregated waiver 













Figure 3: Average State AFDC/Food Stamp Benefit and Need Standard 
year 
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(Fraker and Moffitt 1988). AFDC and now TANF recipients are categorically eligible for food stamps, 
and one applies for both programs in the same location. This makes entrance into the Food Stamp 
Program easier for AFDC recipients. Likewise, the AFDC/food stamp benefit level may not be exogenous 
insofar as states may set a lower benefit level in response to increased AFDC caseloads (Figlio, Kolpin, 
and Reid 1999). Figlio and Ziliak (1999) show that the estimated impacts of the macroeconomy and 
welfare reform on AFDC caseloads are not affected by the inclusion of the AFDC benefit; thus, 
endogeneity in terms of the combined AFDC/food stamp benefits in the present model of food stamp 
caseloads is even less likely to be problematic. However, we will investigate the possibility of 
endogeneity between the food stamp and AFDC caseload levels and will use the state need standard, 
which helps establish AFDC eligibility but not food stamp eligibility, as a key identifying instrument. 
This explicit difference in need standard causality makes this a particularly appealing choice for an 
instrumental variable. 
  The EBT program is a new method of dispensing and using food stamps. Instead of paper 
coupons, food stamp recipients use an EBT card similar to an ATM card. The program is targeted to be 
nationwide by 2002 but has been implemented on at least a pilot basis in selected states beginning in 
1989. Currently, recipients in 37 states use an EBT card (21 states had statewide EBT programs in place 
by the end of the 1998 fiscal year). The goals of the EBT program include reducing the stigma associated 
with food stamp use in stores, preventing theft and loss of benefits, preventing misuse and illegal resale of 
benefits, and improving the distribution of benefits. Because EBT has some appealing features for 
program participants, it may tend to encourage participation. On the other hand, given the low rate of 
checking account holding among low-income households (Hurst, Luoh, and Stafford 1998), the ATM-
type technology underlying the EBT may be a barrier to some households. Paralleling our AFDC waiver 
variables, we use both the USDA approval date for the statewide EBT and the date when EBT was 
implemented statewide (and permit lags of each). 
  Unemployed able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) are now ineligible for food 
stamps except for 3 months in any 36 month period. States can, however, receive an exemption from this 13 
rule instituted by PRWORA. For any area with an unemployment rate over 10 percent and/or an 
insufficient number of jobs, a state can request that affected individuals not be subject to this rule. Our 
ABAWD variable is the percentage of the state that is waived from the ABAWD requirement weighted 
by the share of the waived part to total state population. States with a higher value for the ABAWD 
variable may have higher food stamp caseloads because of the increased number of eligible households. 
The existence of poor economic conditions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ABAWD 
waivers because some eligible states may choose not to apply. As a consequence, estimated effects of 
ABAWD waivers may reflect both the policy treatment effects and the economic conditions that underlie 
the designation of ABAWD waiver areas. Hence, one should interpret the ABAWD policy effects with 
caution, as these two factors may be confounded. 
  The error rate is calculated as the percentage of total dollars that are incorrectly given to or taken 
from food stamp recipients. That is, it is the combination of the over-issuance of benefits, the issuance of 
benefits to ineligible households, and the under-issuance of benefits. The USDA did not include under-
issuances in the official error rates until the mid-1980s, thus requiring us to calculate the under-issuances 
in the early 1980s to make a consistent series. Depending on the year, under-issuances are much less 
common—between 20 and 50 percent of the over-issuance rate. If a state, therefore, had to choose 
whether to cut back on under-issuances or over-issuances, the same percentage decline in the latter would 
lead to a sharper decline in the official error rate. In an effort to cut back on over-issuances, states have 
responded by increasing the frequency with which households have to recertify their eligibility status. 
This increase in application costs has been shown to produce a decrease in the probability of a household 
receiving food stamps (Gundersen and Andrews 2000), a decrease probably due to some households 
being ruled ineligible but also some eligible households deciding not to participate. Thus, we expect a 
direct relationship between error rates and caseloads. 
The vector of political variables includes a dummy variable reflecting which party, if any, 
controls both chambers of the state legislature, a dummy variable for whether the governor is a Democrat, 
and an ADA index that measures the degree of political “liberalness” in a state’s U.S. Senate delegation. 14 
It is hypothesized that eligible households may be more likely to receive food stamps in liberal states 
insofar as there may be less stigma attached to food stamp receipt. We have no a priori reason to believe 
that food stamp caseloads respond sluggishly to changes in a state’s political conditions, so we do not 
permit lagged political factors in our econometric model.
6 
  Finally, a word about the chosen lag structure is merited. The Schwarz criterion, which is a 
goodness-of-fit measure similar to the adjusted R
2 but which penalizes the loss of degrees of freedom 
more heavily, is used to determine optimal lag length for the nonwelfare policy variables. In the fully 
dynamic model, this translates into four lags each of food stamp caseloads, unemployment rates, and per 
capita employment growth rates.
7 We do, however, impose a common one-period lag within the welfare 
policy variables due to concerns of possible collinearity. For example, the ABAWD waiver did not exist 
before the 1997 federal fiscal year, so a two-period lag would render the variable equal to zero for all 
states.  
RESULTS 
  In each of Tables 1 through 4 below, we report six specifications based on waiver approval or 
implementation dates for the basic “any waiver” model, the “any waiver” model with differential pre- and 
post-PRWORA effects, and the model with heterogeneous waiver variables. The results for the dynamic 
models are the implied long-run effects of a change in a given variable on food stamp caseloads. In Table 
5, we report our specifications that incorporate AFDC caseloads, while Table 6 contains decompositions 
of the 1994–1998 decline in food stamp caseloads. 
                                                       
6This prior was borne out in preliminary work that permitted lagged political factors, which were jointly 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
7While the degree of persistence implied by a structure with four lags of the dependent variable seems quite 
high, both Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Eberts and Stone (1991) find similar, or even more pronounced, lag 
structures in their state- and MSA-level analyses of employment, unemployment, and wages. The implication is that 
it takes about a decade for a shock to completely filter through the system. 15 
Static Models 
We begin by setting all coefficients on the lagged variables to zero, as well as the coefficient on 
contemporaneous per capita AFDC caseloads (AFDCit). This yields a static model of food stamp 
caseloads with exogenous regressors, which is an interesting benchmark because of the emphasis on static 
models in several papers on AFDC caseloads (Blank 1997; CEA 1997, 1999). Following the AFDC 
caseload literature, we weight the regression models by state population such that weighted least squares 
yields consistent and efficient parameter estimates. The results are recorded in Table 1. 
  Across all six specifications in Table 1, the coefficient on the unemployment rate is highly 
statistically significant and reveals a strong countercyclical movement of food stamp caseloads. A 
1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to about a 4 percent increase in food stamp 
caseloads. The coefficient on employment growth, however, suggests that food stamp caseloads are 
weakly procyclical; a 0.1 percentage point increase in growth of employment per capita leads to a 2.0 
percent increase in food stamp caseloads. As seen below, this unexpected result, found also by Bartik and 
Eberts (1999) for AFDC caseloads, is due to the omission of caseload dynamics. 
Welfare reform, as measured either by the aggregated “any waiver” or the pre- and post-
PRWORA waiver, has no statistical influence on food stamp caseloads. While the post-PRWORA effect 
is quite sizable in specification 3—food stamp caseloads are 10.3 percent lower after PRWORA—this 
effect is not statistically significant at usual confidence levels. Moreover, the effect goes to zero with the 
use of implementation dates in specification 4. There exists, however, some evidence of statistically 
significant welfare reform effects with the disaggregated welfare waivers. Specifically, states with JOBS 
sanctions waivers experienced food stamp declines 8 percent larger than states without similar waivers, 
while states with family cap waivers had caseload increases of 11 percent larger than states without such 
waivers. That JOBS sanctions have a statistically significant negative influence on food stamp caseloads 
is quite interesting because when a family fails to comply with AFDC work requirements, only the AFDC 
benefit is subject to sanction except in some states where food stamp benefits are also subject to sanction.    16
TABLE 1 
Static Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Macroeconomy 
on Per Capita Food Stamp Program Caseloads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






























    








































































































































Notes: All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions, based on data from fiscal years 
1980–1998 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, are weighted by state population and control for state-specific fixed 
effects and trends. Specifications 1, 3, and 5 are based on AFDC waiver and EBT program approval dates, while specifications 2, 
4, and 6 are based on AFDC waiver and EBT program implementation dates.17 
This result suggests that sanctions are having a spillover effect from AFDC to food stamps, and may 
follow from the fact that one-stop benefit “shopping,” i.e., the fact that AFDC and food stamp benefits 
can be obtained from the same welfare office, is causing sanctioned households to be diverted from food 
stamps as well. The positive family cap effect, on the other hand, suggests that since the AFDC benefit is 
capped for additional children in the 22 states that adopted caps, food stamps are becoming a relatively 
more attractive component of the safety net, and one that families are more likely to seek out. 
Unlike the AFDC waivers, the estimated impact of the EBT is stronger when modeled by the 
implementation date, rather than by the approval date. This most likely occurs because the EBT 
technology has no signaling effect, but rather only influences caseloads after the technology is in place. 
Specifications 2 and 4 indicate that states implementing the EBT program experience about a 5.5 percent 
decline in per capita food stamp caseloads, suggesting that the stigma-reducing effect that should increase 
caseloads in the presence of the EBT is dominated by technological barriers. In contrast to EBT, a state 
with a full-state ABAWD waiver is estimated to experience nearly 30 percent higher caseloads than states 
without waivers. This estimated impact, however, is misleadingly large, since the average ABAWD 
waiver (conditional on having a waiver) covers just 17 percent of the state and the standard deviation is 
less than 19 percent of the state. However, the 5 percent estimated effect of a standard-deviation change 
in the proportion of the state covered by the ABAWD waiver is still substantial and suggests that either 
the very adverse economic conditions necessary to obtain a waiver, and/or the caseload-expanding nature 
of the waiver itself, contribute significantly to the food stamp caseload. The combined AFDC/food stamp 
benefits have an unexpected negative coefficient, but this effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero 
and is not robust to the introduction of dynamics. Finally, error rates are estimated to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on caseloads. A 1 percentage point decrease in the error rate leads to a 30 
percent decline in caseloads. As states move to reduce their error rates, they may expect a similar decline 
in their caseloads. 
  The political makeup of a state has a large estimated influence on food stamp caseloads in the 
static models. States where both legislative chambers are controlled by Republican have about 4 percent 18 
lower caseloads than states where both legislative chambers are Democratic or where chamber control is 
split between the parties. Similarly, states with a Republican governor have about 7 percent lower 
caseloads than do states with Democratic governors. The estimated effects of a Democratic House and 
Senate and the measure of a state’s political “liberalness,” as measured by the voting records of the state’s 
U.S. Senate delegation, are insignificant. 
Dynamic Results 
  In Table 2 we relax the restriction of no dynamic effects by permitting a one-period lag of food 
stamp caseloads. As in the static models, the coefficient on the unemployment rate is highly statistically 
significant and positive. A 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to lead to 
about a 12 percent long-run increase in the food stamp caseload.
8 The coefficient on employment growth 
now indicates the expected countercyclical relationship, but it is still insignificant. 
  The effects of the aggregated welfare reform variables and the pre- and post-PRWORA waivers 
are insignificant in these models, as they were in the static models. However, the sign on the “any waiver” 
variable is now positive rather than negative. The sign on the pre-PRWORA waiver variable is also 
positive, but the sign on the post-PRWORA waiver variable is negative. In the model with approval dates, 
the effect is again strong—food stamp caseloads are 20 percent lower in the long run after PRWORA—
but the long-run effect is only 3.3 percent in the model with implementation dates. As opposed to the 
static models, the effects of JOBS sanctions and family cap are statistically insignificant when either 
approval or implementation dates are used. Unlike the case with static models, states with time limits 
have lower food stamp caseloads when approval dates are used. Insofar as time limits may make 
households less likely to use their limited eligibility period and households move off of food stamps and  
                                                       













 ij are the coefficient(s) 
associated with Xi and ρk are the coefficient(s) associated with the lagged dependent variable.   19
TABLE 2 
AR(1) Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Macroeconomy  
on Per Capita Food Stamp Program Caseloads 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










































    








































































































































Notes: All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. Specifications 1, 3, and 5 are based on AFDC 
waiver and EBT program approval dates, while specifications 2, 4, and 6 are based on AFDC waiver and EBT program 
implementation dates. See notes to Table 1 for further details.20 
AFDC jointly, the negative effect of time limits is not surprising. In addition, regardless of whether 
approval or implementation dates are used, the earnings disregard is positive and significant. This is as 
expected since earnings disregards would tend to encourage continued AFDC recipiency and, possibly, 
encourage some households to enter the AFDC program. Differing from the situation with static models, 
the EBT and ABAWD variables are both insignificant. The combined AFDC/food stamp benefits variable 
is now of the expected sign (positive) but is still insignificant. The impact of error rates is even more 
pronounced in the dynamic model of Table 2—in the long run a 1 percentage point decrease is now 
estimated to lead to about a 42 percent decrease in caseloads. 
  The strong effect of the political variables is still present in the AR(1) models. States that are 
more liberal—as seen through the legislative control variables, the party of the governor, and the political 
“liberalness” of the state’s Senate delegation—have statistically significantly higher caseloads than their 
more conservative neighbors. 
  In Table 3 we report the results from a more fully parameterized dynamic model based on the 
Schwarz criterion, but with the restrictions of no lagged welfare reform effects and no direct AFDC 
caseload effect. Because of the large number of estimated parameters, for ease of presentation we report 
the implied long-run effects of the variables along with the p-value from the null hypothesis that the long-
run effect is zero. In the fully dynamic specifications, the estimated effect of unemployment is double the 
estimate implied by the static model in Table 1—a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment leads to 
about a 9 percent increase in food stamp caseloads. This result is similar across all six specifications, with 
only a slight decline when the disaggregated welfare reform variables are used (specifications 5 and 6). 
As opposed to the previous specifications, the growth in employment per capita is statistically significant 
and quite large—a 0.1 percentage point decrease in the growth of employment per capita, which is a 17 
percent decrease when evaluated at the mean of 0.006, leads to about a 21.5 percent increase in 
specifications 1–4 and a 17 percent increase in specifications 5 and 6. 
  In spite of the introduction of more fully parameterized dynamic specifications, the effect of some 
of the disaggregated welfare reform variables remains strong. In the long run, states with JOBS sanctions    21
TABLE 3 
Dynamic Model Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Macroeconomy 
on Per Capita Food Stamp Program Caseloads: Implied Long-Run Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






























    








































































































































Notes: P-values for the null hypothesis of no long-run effect are in brackets. Specifications 1, 3, and 5 are based on AFDC waiver 
and EBT program approval dates, while specifications 2, 4, and 6 are based on AFDC waiver and EBT program implementation 
dates. See notes to Table 1 for further details.22 
are estimated to have 8.8 percent lower food stamp caseloads than states without JOBS sanctions. (This is 
using implementation dates; the figure is 13.5 percent when using approval dates.) Controlling for other 
factors, states with family caps are estimated to have 8.5 percent higher food stamp caseloads in the long 
run (the figure is 8.1 percent with approval dates) and states with earnings disregard are estimated to have 
10.5 percent higher food stamp caseloads in the long run (8.6 percent with approval dates). Specific 
welfare reform variables have an impact on food stamp caseloads, but the total effect of welfare reform is 
still insignificant, whether measured by the single waiver variable or broken down by pre- and post-
PRWORA waivers. This may be because the effects of the disaggregated welfare reform variables are 
canceling each other out; JOBS sanctions tend to produce declines in food stamp caseloads while earnings 
disregards and family caps tend to produce increases. Thus, states with tough sanctions policies but 
without family caps or higher earnings disregards can expect larger caseload declines, all else equal. The 
EBT and error rates variables are insignificant in all six specifications. The ABAWD waiver variable is 
insignificant in all specifications except when measured by implementation date with disaggregated 
waiver variables. The AFDC/food stamp benefit level enters in the dynamic model much stronger in 
economic terms across all the specifications, with the effect weakly statistically significant in 
specifications 1–4 and strongly significant in specifications 5 and 6. 
  States with a Republican legislature and/or governor continue to have lower caseloads. If the 
Republicans control both chambers of the legislature, food stamp caseloads will be about 7 percent lower 
in the long run, and if the governor is a Republican, food stamp caseloads will be about 4 percent lower. 
  In Table 4 we expand on our dynamic model in Table 3 by permitting the welfare policy variables 
to have a contemporaneous and one-period lagged effect on log per capita food stamp caseloads. Most 
noticeable in Table 4 are the reduced impacts of per capita employment growth rates and several of the 
welfare policy variables. Specifically, the long-run effect of employment growth rates falls about 15 
percent on average across the six specifications and loses some of its statistical significance. Likewise, 
JOBS sanctions and family caps fall in importance in Table 4, especially with the implementation dates in 
specification 6. Interestingly, however, the EBT becomes strongly negative in models using    23
TABLE 4 
Dynamic Model Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Macroeconomy on Per Capita 
Food Stamp Program Caseloads with One Lag of Welfare Reform Variables: Implied Long-Run Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






























    








































































































































Notes: P-values for the null hypothesis of no long-run effect are in brackets. All regressions, based on data from fiscal years 
1980–1998 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, are weighted by state population, and control for state-specific fixed 
effects and trends. Specifications 1, 3, and 5 are based on AFDC waiver and EBT program approval dates, while specifications 2, 
4, and 6 are based on AFDC waiver and EBT program implementation dates.24 
implementation dates––the EBT leads to about a 10 percent decline in food stamp caseloads in the long 
run. Overall, though, inclusion of lags in welfare policies is pushing the data a bit too far, and thus the 
results in Table 3 are perhaps more credible. 
Simultaneous Determination of Food Stamp and AFDC Caseloads 
  The models in Tables 1–4 can be viewed as reduced-form models in that they do not explicitly 
consider the possibility that food stamp caseloads may covary with AFDC caseloads. In Table 5 we relax 
this restriction by appending to specification 3 of Table 3 the log of per capita AFDC caseloads. As 
alluded to earlier, it is possible that food stamp and AFDC caseloads are jointly determined, which if true 
implies that weighted least squares estimates with AFDC caseloads are inconsistent. To address this 
possibility we employ an instrumental variables estimator to identify the model parameters. The 
identifying instrument is the log of the state need standard, which is used to determine AFDC eligibility 
but not food stamp eligibility. In addition, we include as overidentifying instruments the one-period lag of 
the need standard, as well as interactions of the need standard with the political variables. A potentially 
useful instrument is the one-period lag of AFDC caseloads, but this is only valid in a first difference panel 
data model and not in the levels model of equation 1 (Keane and Runkle 1992). Consequently, we present 
five specifications: weighted least squares in levels and first differences, weighted instrumental variables 
in levels and first differences using all instruments except the lagged AFDC caseloads, and weighted 
instrumental variables in first differences with the lagged AFDC caseloads as an instrument.
9 
  It is apparent from Table 5, in which specifications 1 and 3 treat AFDC cases as exogenous and 
specifications 2, 4, and 5 treat AFDC cases as endogenous, that the potential simultaneity of AFDC and 
food stamp caseloads is of secondary importance when one is interested in estimating the effects of 
policies or the macroeconomy on food stamp caseloads. For instance, when estimating models in levels,  
                                                       
9The last two rows of Table 5 contain model specification tests for the instrumental variables estimator, a 
first-stage F-test of the correlation of the overidentifying instruments with the endogenous regressor, and the Sargan 
test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions.   25
TABLE 5 
Dynamic Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the 
Macroeconomy on Per Capita Food Stamp Caseloads: Implied Long-Run Effects 
  Levels   First  Differences 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 


















































































































































P-value on Wald Test of 
Validity of Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
 0.003      0.312  0.439 
Notes: P-values for the null hypothesis of no long-run effect are in brackets. All regressions, based on data from fiscal years 1980–
1998 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, are weighted by state population, control for state-specific fixed effects and 
trends, and are based on AFDC waiver and EBT program approval dates. All regressions control for AFDC caseloads; in 
specifications 2 and 4 AFDC caseloads are instrumented by the AFDC need standard, the lagged AFDC standard, and the AFDC 
need standard interacted with the political party variables, while specification 5 adds one-period lagged AFDC caseloads to the 
instrument set.26 
the implied long-run effect of the unemployment rate is only 13 percent higher when treating AFDC 
caseloads as endogenous than when treating them as exogenous. In the differences specification, this 
difference is about 15 percent. Similarly small absolute differences between specifications (9 and 11 
percent) are observed with regard to the estimated employment growth effects. When considering other 
variables, treatment of AFDC caseloads as endogenous occasionally leads to a reduction in magnitude or 
statistical significance of a treatment effect (e.g., with regard to EBT, in the difference specifications, or 
to AFDC/food stamp benefits in either levels or differences), but even in these cases the qualitative 
conclusions drawn from the results do not vary. Therefore, the treatment of AFDC caseloads as 
endogenous apparently does not affect the estimated effects of policy variables and the macroeconomy on 
food stamp caseloads in any substantive manner. 
Caseload Decompositions 
  We now turn to an oft-asked question: How much of the post-1994 decline in food stamp 
caseloads is attributable to welfare reform and how much is attributable to the macroeconomy? To answer 
this question we focus on the models in Tables 1–3.  
  In the static models (Table 1), for any variable xj, the proportion of caseload change from 1994 to 




j and C is the caseload. For the AR(1) models (Table 2) the 


































 1 is the parameter associated with the first lagged caseload, and so forth. For each equation, we 
then average over the states to arrive at the impact of the variable. Because more than one variable may be 
associated with “welfare reform” or “the macroeconomy,” we then sum over the relevant variables to 
arrive at the percentage of the decline associated with welfare reform and the macroeconomy. In each of 
these models, the remaining decomposition can be ascribed to political variables, the other variables 
reflecting welfare policy, year fixed effects, and state time trends.
10  
  The results from the decompositions are in Table 6. In the static models, the macroeconomy 
explains about 20 percent of the food stamp caseload decline. The effect of welfare reform varies widely, 
from a high of 28.2 percent in specification 3, to a low of –4.7 percent in specification 4.
11 In comparison 
to the static models, the AR(1) model predicts that the macroeconomic expansion explains more than 
twice as much of the decline, from 47.3 percent in specification 5 to 73.6 percent in specification 6. 
Except for specification 4, the effect of welfare reform is substantially less than in the static models, 
ranging from –2.7 percent to 9.8 percent. In the fully dynamic estimates from Table 3, the effect of the 
macroeconomy diminishes somewhat, with a range of 35.0 percent to 45.3 percent. The impact is still, 
however, substantially greater than the estimated effect of welfare reform, which ranges from –7.1 
percent to 9.6 percent.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
  This paper provides some of the first evidence of a relationship between welfare reform, the 
macroeconomy, and food stamp caseloads. Our results demonstrate that the macroeconomy has  
                                                       
10For all specifications in Tables 1 and 2, we sum over the effects of the unemployment rate and 
employment growth per capita variables to calculate the effect of the macroeconomy. Similarly, for all specifications 
in Tables 3, we sum over the effects of all the current and lagged unemployment rate and employment growth per 
capita variables. For specifications 1 and 2 in all tables, we use the “any waiver” variable to arrive at the effect of 
welfare reform; for specifications 3 and 4, we sum over the pre- and post- “any waiver” variables; and for 
specifications 5 and 6 we sum over the six disaggregated variables. 
11In specifications 1–4 the effect of welfare reform is not statistically significant at usual confidence levels. 
Thus, the decomposition accorded to “welfare reform” must be treated with caution. In comparison, the 
macroeconomic variables, especially the unemployment rates, are strongly statistically significant.   28
 
TABLE 6 
Decomposition of the Relative Impacts of the Macroeconomy and Welfare Reform 
on Food Stamp Caseloads: 1994 to 1998 
Percent  Attributable  to:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Static  Estimates 
    Macroeconomy  20.52 19.97 20.46 20.04 20.46 20.14 
  Welfare Reform  5.98  4.38  28.28  -4.71  22.80  8.19 
  AR(1) Estimates 
    Macroeconomy  53.72 50.74 49.29 67.73 47.28 73.62 
  Welfare Reform  -2.34  -2.90  9.97  -2.67  9.80  -3.08 
  Dynamic Estimates without One Lag of Welfare Variables 
    Macroeconomy  35.73 35.71 34.96 37.39 38.63 45.29 
  Welfare Reform  -7.17  -4.50  4.62  -0.41  9.58  5.28 
Notes: All regressions, based on data from fiscal years 1980–1998 for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, are 
weighted by state population and control for state-specific fixed effects and trends. The coefficients used for the 
static estimates are in Table 1; for the AR(1) estimates, Table 2; and for the dynamic estimates without one lag of 
welfare variables, Table 3.29 
substantially influenced the recent decline in food stamp caseloads. In our preferred models, up to 45 
percent of the decline in food stamp caseloads can be attributed to the macroeconomy. This substantial 
influence suggests that during the next recession, food stamp caseloads will likely increase again. More 
specifically, our results indicate that a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate will lead to an 8 
percent increase in food stamp caseloads. 
  In comparison to the effect of the macroeconomy, the estimated aggregate effect of welfare 
reform is modest and is not consistent across model specifications. Similar to Ziliak et al. (2000), we do 
find substantial heterogeneity in the impact of waiver and TANF policies—states with JOBS sanctions 
policies but not family cap or earnings disregard waivers can expect a larger long-run decline in caseloads 
than those states with all three policies. While the effects of foodstamp-specific policies such as the EBT, 
ABAWD waivers, and error rates are not consistent across specifications, a common finding is that states 
with ABAWD waivers can expect higher caseload levels than states without the waivers and that the EBT 
program is leading to food stamp caseload declines.  
  Our estimates also reveal that the specification of caseload and business cycle dynamics have 
important implications for the estimated effects of policy changes and economic factors—when dynamic 
models are employed, we observe substantially reduced welfare reform effects but significantly increased 
effects of the macroeconomy on food stamp caseloads. This pattern of results is robust not only to the lag 
structure of the dynamics but also to the simultaneous determination of AFDC caseload levels. Hence, in 
comparison to modeling food stamp caseload dynamics, modeling the simultaneity of food stamp and 
AFDC caseloads seems of lesser concern when estimating the effect of the business cycle and welfare 




Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Log Per Capita Food Stamp Caseloads  -3.476  0.373 
Log Per Capita AFDC Caseloads  -4.327  0.411 
Unemployment Rate  0.064  0.022 
Per Capita Employment Growth Rate  0.006  0.022 
Log Real AFDC/Food Stamp Benefit  6.139  0.214 
Log Real Need Standard  5.977  0.352 
Error Rate  0.099  0.041 
AFDC Waiver  0.166  0.360 
EBT 0.089  0.274 
ABAWD 0.019  0.082 
Time Limits  0.119  0.302 
JOBS Exemptions  0.138  0.333 
JOBS Sanctions  0.142  0.337 
Earnings Disregards  0.136  0.332 
Family Cap  0.071  0.250 
Work Requirements  0.109  0.301 
Both Houses Democratic  0.537  0.499 
Both Houses Republican  0.247  0.431 
Governor Democratic  0.548  0.498 
Senate ADA Score  3.880  0.662 
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